We study a multi-person bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of Shaked's game of cycling o®ers with exogenous breakdown. If preferences are assumed to be \smooth" then in the limit as the risk of breakdown vanishes, our approach leads to an outcome in which bargainers are equally marginally bold, where a bargainer's marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position. Under smoothness, any nonexpected utility Nash outcome, as de¯ned in Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) , is an equally marginally bold outcome. However, unlike the concept of Nash outcome, a unique equally marginally bold outcome exists in natural cases, in particular, if all bargainers have risk averse preferences of the rank dependent expected utility type. For these preferences, the equally marginally bold outcome maximizes a \bargaining power" adjusted (asymmetric) Nash product where the degree of asymmetry is determined by the disparity in the marginal valuation of certainty among bargainers.
Introduction
Bargainers' attitudes toward risk have long played a central role in many formal theories of bargaining. The notion that bargainers bear in mind the risk of a breakdown in negotiations has been recognized at least since Zeuthen (1930) , but it was Nash's (1950 Nash's ( , 1953 approach, which caught on and held sway in economic modeling. However, expected utility theory, upon which Nash's analysis is built, has been challenged on introspective, experimental and empirical grounds. Our starting point in this paper is to note that the Sutton program may be used not simply to support an appealing set of axioms, but also to explore possible extensions of the Nash solution to a more general family of risk preferences, and to do that in a multi-person or multilateral framework. To carry out this extension we follow a simple generalization of the alternating-o®ers protocol suggested by Shaked (a textbook reference is Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) p. 63) . In Shaked's game, bargainers rotate in making proposals, and the requirement for agreement is unanimity. If an o®er is rejected, then there is a risk of breakdown of negotiations, yielding the disagreement outcome.
The connection between the interactive (or purely game theoretic) and the decision theoretic sides of this model is in itself worthy of some discussion, and a major contribution of this paper. In essence, any variation of the alternating-o®ers protocol is a story of temporal monopoly: an agreement is seen as the outcome of a dynamic game in which individuals are each given in turn the right to ask their opponents to accept a sure payo®, or bear the risk of 1 See, for instance, Machina (1987) and the references therein.
2 The seminal reference is Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) , which in turn has led to follow-up papers by Grant and Kajii (1994, 1995) , Valenciano and Zarzuelo (1994) , Hanany and Safra (1998) and Houba, Tieman, and Brinksma (1998) . A somewhat di®erent approach is taken in Safra and Zilcha (1993) .
ending up with nothing. This choice problem is also at the basis of a class of systematic violations of expected utility theory known as the certainty e®ect or common ratio e®ect. 3 The fact that individuals`over-value' outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable, was¯rst recognized by Allais (1953) , and is perhaps the most systematically observed violation of the expected utility theory. Exploiting this relationship, we are able: (i) to characterize stationary subgame perfect equilibrium o®ers in Shaked's game for Allais-type preferences, and (ii) to show that as the risk of breakdown vanishes, the limit of stationary subgame o®ers is an outcome in which all bargainers are equally marginally bold, where a bargainer's marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position. This result o®ers a linkage between the degree of departure from expected utility and the outcome of bargaining. Indeed, it is bargainers' attitude towards small risks|in particular, a measure of`probabilistic' risk aversion|which plays the major role in the determination of their bargaining power.
There are, of course, prices to pay. In this paper, bargainers have general preferences over simple lotteries and compound lotteries are reduced by multiplying through the probabilities.
Thus, at any stage of the rotating o®ers game, bargainers only care about the distribution over outcomes induced by every possible continuation of the game, and not the timing of resolution per se. In particular, our assumptions are incompatible with Machina's (1989) formulation of dynamic behavior for non-expected utility decision makers, in which ex post preferences are derived from ex ante preferences by conditioning on any borne risk. They are also incompatible with Segal's (1990) approach, in which preferences are time separable, but compound lotteries are not ranked by their induced distribution over¯nal outcomes. In contrast, Karni and Safra's (1989) `behaviorally consistent' strategy for dealing with dynamic choice does¯t into our framework. We¯nd it reassuring that Karni and Safra's theory agrees with recent empirical¯ndings on dynamic versions of common ratio problems that reject the approaches by Machina and Segal. 4 Another price is the di®erentiability assumption. As the name suggests, equally marginally boldness is a tangency condition that is not well de¯ned without the di®erentiability of the function representing the bargainers' risk preferences over the class of binary lotteries obtained by mixing the disagreement outcome with any other single outcome. We contend, however, that the gain from the di®erentiability assumption far exceeds the cost, since practically all speci¯c non-expected utility functionals that have been employed in theoretical 3 See Camerer (1995) for a review of such¯ndings. 4 Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden (1998). and empirical research are di®erentiable in this sense.
The plan of the reminder of this paper is as follows: After setting-up the model in Section 2, in Section 3 we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in Shaked's game. We devote Section 4 to an exploration of the concept of marginal boldness.
In Section 5, we present the convergence result. Finally, in Section 6 we explore the relation among equally marginally bold outcomes and generalizations to the multi-person case of the outcomes proposed by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) and by Safra and Zilcha (1993) .
Basic Setup
There is a perfectly divisible object of size 1. There are I, I¸2, bargainers who negotiate over how the object should be divided. Let us denote by x i¸0 the share that bargainer i receives. The set of feasible divisions, or the set of outcomes, is denoted by X, with its generic element x = ¡ x 1 ; :::;
by 4 the interior of X.
There is a given, designated disagreement outcome, denoted by D. The set X [ fDg is endowed with the natural ¾-¯eld, where the point D is regarded as a discrete point.
Denote by L the set of lotteries (probability measures) with¯nite support over X [ fDg.
An elementary lottery is one whose support consists of at most one outcome from X and the disagreement outcome D. We shall denote by px the elementary lottery that yields the outcome x with probability p. The set of elementary lotteries is denoted by L e .
Bargainer i has a continuous preference relation º i on L: Throughout the paper, we shall keep the set of feasible divisions X and the disagreement outcome D¯xed, and so a bargaining problem is naturally identi¯ed with a collection of preferences
. We shall assume that the object is`private' (in the sense that bargainer i is only concerned with his share of the pie) and`desirable' (so that preferences º i are monotone with respect to the relation of¯rst order stochastic dominance, with strict dominance on L e .) We shall also assume each bargainer views D as the least desirable. Thus, from bargainer's i point of view, D may be identi¯ed with (any) x in X for which x i = 0. 5 Since the object is private, we shall represent agent i's preferences over L e by a continuous function
There is an analogy between our bargaining setting and a pure exchange economy with a public good, p, and a private good, x. Any elementary lottery px induces marginal distributions (p; x 1 ); : : : ; (p; x I ) that can be interpreted as bargainers' consumption bundles derived from px. Feasibility requires 1¸p¸0; x i¸0 ; and P I i=1 x i = 1. E±ciency implies p = 1 (i.e. only degenerate lotteries are e±cient).
given by the rule: V i (p; x)¸V i (q; y) if and only if px º i qy for any x; y with x i = x; y i = y.
We shall normalize V i so that V i (p; 0) = 0 for all p and V i (1; 1) = 1. Notice that such V i is unique up to monotonic transformation.
Later in the paper we shall assume that we can pick a function V i as above for each i satisfying: Notice that condition DUEL is weak enough to accommodate preferences of the weighted utility class introduced by Chew (1983) , of the class which Gul's (1991) dubbed as`disappointment averse' (DA), and also preferences of the`Rank Dependent' family, including Quiggin's (1982) `anticipated' or Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) preferences, and Puppe's (1991) homogeneous RDEU preferences with prize-dependent distortion of the probabilities.
Preference relations that allow a multiplicatively separable form, i.e.
represent a natural reference point in our analysis. When g i is linear, preferences are said to be disagreement linear (DL), 7 which includes the expected utility (EU) preferences. Notice that preferences which do not have a multiplicatively separable representation on L may have one on L e . For instance, the DA functional has a multiplicatively separable representation.
In this case, g i (p) has the form p=
3 The bargaining game 3.1 Shaked's rotating o®ers protocol Grant and Kajii (1995) with probability 1 ¡ ½ the game concludes and bargainers receive the disagreement outcome D. We assume that bargainer 1 proposes in the¯rst period.
A history is a speci¯cation of a point in the game tree and the actions (proposals and rejections) taken at each decision node in the game up to that point. A (pure) strategy for
, speci¯es a feasible action at every history at which he must act. A strategy pro¯le is a I¡tuple of strategies, one for each bargainer.
Any continuation strategy pro¯le ¾ = ¡ ¾ i ; ¾ ¡i ¢ uniquely determines the agreed division x = ¡ x 1 ; :::; x I ¢ 2 X, and the period ¿ in which the agreement is reached, or no agreement is ever reached. We shall assume that compound lotteries, in which the uncertainty is solved sequentially rather than simultaneously, are reduced to probability measures on L by the usual multiplication rule. Thus from bargainer i's viewpoint, the continuation strategy pro¯le ¾ can be naturally identi¯ed as an elementary lottery ½ ¿ x i on L e , and the payo® of bargainer
A strategy pro¯le is subgame perfect if, at every history, it is a best response to itself.
We say ¾ is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) if ¾ is a subgame perfect equilibrium and the actions it prescribes in every period do not depend on time, nor on the actions in previous periods. In particular, each i' s proposal is time independent, thus we write x i = ¡ x 1 i ; :::; x I i ¢ for the proposal bargainer i makes when he is the proposer. We refer to the x i , i = 1; :::; I, as SSPE proposals.
As Shaked showed in the expected utility case when I > 2, any feasible division may be supported using subgame perfect pure strategies provided that ½ is large enough. As the same problem arises in our case where we are expanding the class of preferences for bargainers, we shall concentrate on SSPE from now on. 8
The certainty e®ect and SSPE Outcomes
Within the EU framework, the characterization of SSPE outcomes in Shaked's game builds upon the property that in any round the proposer can extract from the other bargainers any surplus in excess of their certainty equivalent from delaying agreement until the next round. In our setting, it means bargainer i proposes x i such that any other bargainer j gets a share
, and all j accept. But if V is not linear in ½ and there are more than two bargainers, this property is not su±cient for x i to be a SSPE. To see this, consider a three bargainers situation in which V 3 ¡ 1;
8 Additional support for the restriction to this kind of strategies comes (at least in the two-person case) from the experimental work of Zwick, Rapoport, and Howard (1992) . The following lemma demonstrates that if each bargainer's preference relation satis¯es DICE, then we can succinctly characterize the set of SSPE proposals by proving that in any SSPE equilibrium, i will o®er j the certainty equivalent of the amount that j would get in the next period in which he is the proposer if all intermediate o®ers are rejected. DICE guarantees that if bargainer j is willing to reject today's o®er by i in order to accept tomorrow's o®er by i + 1; he must be also willing to reject i + 1's o®er in anticipation of accepting the next period's proposal by i + 2. The argument applies iteratively until it is j's turn to make a proposal. As a conclusion, i's optimal o®er to j only depends on what j will propose for himself.
Let ¿ (i; j) be j ¡ i if i · j and I ¡ (i ¡ j) otherwise (i.e., if i is the proposer in period t, then j is the proposer in period t + ¿ (i; j).) Then, Lemma 3.1 Suppose DICE holds. The proposals x i , i = 1; :::; I, corresponding to a SSPE are always accepted, and they are characterized by:
Proof. We shall proceed in four stages:
There is no SSPE where all proposals are rejected: By contradiction, suppose that there was a SSPE where an agreement is never reached. In particular, bargainer 1's proposal is rejected in period 1. Consider the (possibly) o®-equilibrium subgame that commences in period 1 after bargainer 1 has made an equal share proposal, that is, x j 1 = 1=I for all j 2 f1; : : : ; Ig. Since strategies are stationary, this sub-game can be analyzed in reduced form as a sequential move game where, in order, each bargainer j = 2; : : : ; I decides whether to accept or reject the proposal, and such that any rejection leads to the disagreement outcome with probability one. A straightforward backward induction argument shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium decision for each bargainer in this reduced single round of bargaining game is to accept the proposal. Hence an equal share proposal for bargainer 1 in period 1 strictly dominates his proposal in the putative SSPE which by assumption is rejected and leads in equilibrium to the disagreement outcome with probability one. Therefore no SSPE exists in which o®ers are rejected in every round.
In a SSPE proposals are always accepted: If not, there is a bargainer i whose proposal is rejected and bargainer i + 1's proposal x i+1 is accepted in the SSPE, since in the previous stage we have shown that some bargainer's proposal must be agreeable. Since utility is increasing in p, there must be a proposal
or each j. But if such an x i is proposed by bargainer i, it must be accepted, since if rejected, x i+1 will be the¯nal outcome because of the stationarity. Then bargainer i would be better o®, which is a contradiction.
In a SSPE proposals satisfy (1): Let x i be an SSPE outcome in the period where bargainer i is the proposer, i = 1; :::; I. Fix a bargainer i. Then for any j, j 6 = i, V j
j´c annot be the case, since otherwise bargainer j rejects proposals until it is his turn and then proposes x j and x j is accepted. This is equivalent to bargainer j receiving x j j with probability ½ ¿ (i;j) and D with probability 1 ¡ ½ ¿ (i;j) at the time when i makes a proposal, thus accepting x j i is not a best response for j. Hence,
ust hold for any i and j. Now we shall show that
j´f or any i 6 = j, by induction on n = ¿ (i; j). First, pick any i and j with ¿ (i; j) = 1 (i.e., j is
j´h olds. Then in the subgame where bargainer i proposes y
j´, bargainer j must accept the proposal, thus bargainer i is not optimizing, a contradiction. This establishes the claim for n = 1. Now let n > 1 and suppose that V j
j´h olds for any i 6 = j with ¿ (i; j) < n. Pick any i and j with ¿ (i; j) = n. For any k such that ¿ (k; j) = 1; ::; n ¡ 1,
j´h olds by the induction hypothesis. Thus by DICE, we have
j´f or any k such that ¿ (k; j) = 1; ::; n ¡ 1. This shows that in any subgame where j = i + n has rejected bargainer i's o®er, his (ex-ante) payo® is at most
it must be accepted. Therefore V j
Proposals x i , i = 1; :::; I, satisfying (1) can be supported in a SSPE: Pick any proposals
x i , i = 1; :::; I, satisfying (1). Consider the stationary strategy for bargainer i where, if it is his turn to be the proposer he proposes x i , and, if some other individual j 6 = i, is the proposer,
, and rejects otherwise. We shall
show that this pro¯le of strategy constitutes an SSPE. Since we can truncate the game to be of¯nite length and bargainers still receive the same payo®, if a stationary strategy pro¯le is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, then there exists a bargainer with a pro¯table one shot deviation.
11 Hence it su±ces to show that there is no pro¯table one shot deviation for each bargainer i. We shall split this proof into two cases, depending upon the role of proposer or responder of bargainer i.
² Bargainer i is the proposer in period t: If i proposes more than x i i for himself, then there exists at least one bargainer j who is now o®ered b x
j´, j will reject. So by proposing more, i will receive x i i+1 with probability ½ and D with probability 1 ¡ ½. But we have
and so
² Bargainer j 6 = i is the proposer: Bargainer i is o®ered x i j where
If he rejects then he will receive x i j+1 with probability ½ and D with probability 1 ¡ ½,
Thus, provided that a solution x i , i = 1; :::; I, to (1) exists and preferences satisfy DICE, the equilibrium path of a SSPE consists of the¯rst bargainer proposing x 1 and everyone accepting it (which ends the game). Hence, x 1 is the outcome induced by such SSPE, or simply a SSPE outcome.
Remark: In the proof of Lemma 3.1 we use DICE only when I > 2. Thus, for the two-person case, Lemma 3.1 derives from¯rst order stochastic dominance alone. Notice that in this case SSPE proposals are characterized by Rubinstein-like equations
¢ .
Existence and uniqueness of SSPE
We shall¯rst show that under DICE, 12 an SSPE outcome exists and every SSPE outcome is better than D for every bargainer. In order to do this, let us write Á ¡ ½; z 1 ; :::; Proof. LetÁ ¡ ½; z 1 ; :::
. 
for j 6 = 1; 2, and since the certainty equivalent function c j is increasing in probability, we have
Since c 1 ¡ ½ ¿ (2;1) ; ¹ z 1 ¢ = 0, the calculation above shows that 1 < c 2 ¡ ½; ¹ z 2 ¢ +1 ¡ ¹ z 2 , and hence One obvious approach to establishing su±cient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium is to¯nd conditions under which Á has a unique¯xed point. In the EU case, Merlo and Wilson (1995) provide the following su±cient condition on each bargainer's preferences, which holds whenever the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of such bargainer is concave:
12 Again, from a formal standpoint, this statement is unecessarily strong. DICE only matter in this paper as a su±cient condition for the characterization of Lemma 3.1 to hold. In the two-person case this result is true even without DICE, and so are the remaining statements concerning existence, uniqueness and convergence of SSPE outcomes.
CEC (Certainty equivalent contraction): c i (p; ¢) is a contraction for any p < 1.
13
Notice that, together with DUEL, CEC implies:
x (p; ¢) < 1 for any p < 1.
In our more general framework, however, CEC ¤ alone does not guarantee uniqueness.
An additional potential source of multiplicity is the existence of non-monotonic cross-e®ects between probabilities and prizes. Thus, we require: 
ing with respect to p and noting c i is increasing in both arguments, we get c
Proposition 3.3 Under DICE and DUEL, if preferences satisfy CEC ¤ and IMCE, then the SSPE outcome is unique for any ½ 2 (0; 1), and it is a continuously di®erentiable function of ½ on ½ 2 (0; 1).
Proof. It su±ces to show that Á has a unique¯xed point, or equivalently, for any¯xed ½ 2 (0; 1), the vector¯eld © ¡ ½; z 1 ; :::; z I ¢´z ¡Á ¡ ½; z 1 ; :::; z I ¢ de¯ned on (0; 1) I has a unique zero. We shall¯rst show that the Jacobian matrix of © (½; ¢) has a positive determinant 13 That is, given p < 1, there is a ± < 1 such that for any x, y 2 [0; 1],¯c i (p; x) ¡ c i (p; y)¯< ± jx ¡ yj.
14 These conditions are satis¯ed in natural cases: concavity of the certainty utility function is prevalent in generalized risk preference models. For instance, in the case of RDEU preferences, it is a necessary condition for risk aversion. A positive cross derivative also seems plausible as it states the marginal value of improving one's allocation increases the more likely it is there will be an agreement. In fact, for any multiplicatively separable functional, V i px (p; x) > 0 is implied by DUEL alone.
everywhere; that is, the determinant of the following matrix 0
is positive. Condition CEC ¤ guarantees that (i) every o®-diagonal entry is strictly less than one. IMCE implies that (ii) for any i 6 = j, the element (i; j) is smaller than the element (i + 1; j). Theorem A in Appendix shows that a square matrix with ones in the diagonal and o®-diagonal elements satisfying (i) and (ii) has positive determinant.
Then by the index theorem, 15 © (½; ¢) has a unique zero, which can be written as a C 1 function by the implicit function theorem.
Boldness
We shall show in the next section that as the risk of breakdown in Shaked's game converges to zero, that is as ½ ! 1, the sequence of SSPE outcomes converges to an outcome in which one may view all the bargainers as equally marginally bold. Marginal boldness is a`generalized utility' analog of Aumann and Kurz's (1977) boldness measure of attitudes toward risking large losses, in contrast with the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion, which measure attitudes toward small risks only. Let us consider a given proposed division x = ¡ x 1 ; :::; x I ¢ 2 4 and imagine that bargainer i demands a small addition, s > 0, to his share. He will be prepared to risk a probability of disagreement up to the level q(s), where q (s) is implicitly
We shall de¯ne the marginal boldness of bargainer i at outcome x as q 0 (0), i.e. the limit (when it exists) of the di®erence quotient De¯nition 1 The marginal boldness b i (x) of bargainer i at x 2 X is de¯ned as:
Intuitively, the marginal boldness o®ers a¯rst order approximation to the cost for bargainer i of risking x i (measured in terms of outcome). Clearly, the marginal boldness is invariant to any ordinal transformation of the function V i , thus the concept of marginal boldness does not depend on the choice of utility function. Notice also that in the expected utility case,
, which is the Aumann-Kurz marginal boldness measure. Continuing the analogy with the Aumann-Kurz's analysis, let us de¯ne: De¯nition 2 Outcome x 2 4 is deemed equally marginally bold (EMB) for the bargainers
Thus, at any EMB outcome the cost of risking their share is the same for all bargainers.
An attractive feature of the EMB concept is that it exists under fairly weak assumptions on the utility representations. Namely, Proof. See Appendix.
In particular, if condition DUEL is satis¯ed then an EMB outcome exists. For multiplicatively separable preferences, it can be readily seen that the equally marginally bold outcomes are characterized by the¯rst order conditions of the following maximization program:
Notice the similarity with the`bargaining power' adjusted (i.e. asymmetric) Nash bargaining outcome in the expected utility case. In the above program, we can interpret
as bargainer i's bargaining power. This is quite intuitive as g i p (1) may be viewed as the bargainer's marginal evaluation of certainty for a given prize (that is better than the disagreement outcome). The greater is g i p (1), the larger is the premium placed upon certainty by bargainer i, and hence other things being equal, the less bold is the bargainer in pushing for a better split. If bargainer i is weakly risk averse and g i (1) = 1, it follows that g i p (1)¸1. Thus the relative`over-valuation' of certainty by the bargainer (that is, the degree of`probabilistic' risk aversion of the bargainer) in conjunction with the degree to which their marginal utility for the pie diminishes determines the EMB outcome.
A simple su±cient condition for the uniqueness of the equally bold outcome is that each bargainer's marginal boldness is negatively related to his share of the pie; that is, if for all x; y with x i 6 = y i ,
Indeed, if x; y are equally marginally bold outcomes with x 6 = y, then without loss of generality, we can assume x 1 > y 1 and x 2 < y 2 . But this implies that b 1 (x) <b 1 (y) and (5), which contradicts the fact that both x and y are equally marginally bold outcomes.
It is straightforward to check that if b i is strictly decreasing for all i, then (5) holds, and therefore uniqueness of the EMB outcome follows. If condition DUEL is assumed, since (3) we have c i p (1; x) = 1=b i (x) for any x with x i = x, and therefore c 
The limit result
In this section we obtain a characterization of the limit of SSPE outcomes as the parameter 1¡½ measuring the risk of breakdown tends to zero. We assume DICE and DUEL throughout Proof. Pick any increasing sequence f½ n : n = 1; :::g with lim n!1 ½ n = 1. Since an EMB outcome is unique and X is compact, it su±ces to show ¹ x is an EMB outcome, assuming
where 1=b j (¹ x) = 0 if b j (¹ x) = +1, by convention (see (3)). To see this,¯rst recall that x (½ n ) satis¯es (1) by Proposition 3.1, and x j i (½ n ) < x j j (½ n ) for each i; j, i 6 = j. Applying the mean value theorem to the function t 7 ! V j ³ t + (1 ¡ t) ½ ¿(i;j) ; tx j i (½) + (1 ¡ t) x j j (½)´, for every n and for every pair i and j (i 6 = j), we can¯nd some
Since V j x > 0 by DUEL, we can re-write the expression above as
for any given n. As ½ n ! 1, for all i and j we have x j i (½ n ) ! ¹ x j from (1), and so s
Hence, the left hand side converges to 1=b j (¹ x), as desired.
for each j. Fix any i and j with i 6 = j, and consider functions
¢ de¯ned on [½ n ; 1] for any given n. By Cauchy's mean
We have shown that the right hand side converges to r j and so we have
Since the equilibrium o®ers sum up to one by construction,
= 0 holds for any i 6 = 1. Di®erentiating this relation with respect to ½, and using (7), we get
, and it is equal to (I ¡ i + 1) otherwise. So, for each i = 2; :::; I, we can re-write this relation as
where ® i = P I j=i r j and ¹ r = P I j=1 r j . Hence ® i = ¹ r (I ¡ i + 1) =I for each i = 2; :::; I. So,
Discussion
Let us conclude with a discussion on the connection between the concept of EMB outcome and the other extensions of the Nash solution to general risk preferences in the literature.
Comparison with Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson's extension
The Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson's ordinal Nash solution associates with a two-person bargaining problem
its ordinal Nash outcome (or simply Nash outcome), de¯ned as the element x 2 X such that for both i there is no p 2 [0; 1] and y 2 X such that py Â i x and px Á j y. In our setting, one may wish to interpret this outcome x, as one against which neither bargainer can extract a concession from the other due to the common risk of disagreement, 1 ¡ p, that each perceives exists if he sticks with his position. In order to compare the concept of ordinal Nash outcome with the concept of EMB outcome, one must¯rst extend Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson's de¯nition to our multi-person setting. The critical issue
here is to de¯ne the way that the cost of a concession sought by bargainer i can be allocated among the other bargainers. A natural extension for a multilateral bargaining setting is to allow a bargainer to seek concessions simultaneously from any number of the other bargainers. This is reinforced by the public good nature of the probability of disagreement. More speci¯cally, if bargainer i threatens to leave the negotiation table, the negative public e®ect from disagreement will be borne by all the bargainers, considerably increasing his ability to extract concessions. Unfortunately, although intuitively appealing, we show in the appendix that, if I > 2, no outcome survives this criterion, even for smooth EU preferences.
A way to recover existence of Nash outcomes in a multi-person setting is to allow a bargainer only to seek a concession from one other bargainer. Notice that this smaller°e xibility in`¯nancing' a given concession makes it much more di±cult for a bargainer to appeal successfully against a given allocation. More formally, this second scenario leads to the following:
De¯nition 3 Bargainer i can appeal against x if there exists j, q 2 [0; 1] and s > 0; such
ordinal Nash outcome if no bargainer can appeal against x.
Notice that the ordinal Nash outcome is invariant to monotonic transformations of V i .
Obviously, this coincides with Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson's solution when I = 2.
To establish the link between EMB outcomes and ordinal Nash outcomes, for any x 2 X and every i, let
. Then it can be readily shown that bargainer i has no successful appeal against
x if and only if for each j 6 = i, (q; s) = (0; 0) maximizes ® i x subject to¯j x = 0. The¯rst order necessary condition for this maximization problem is equivalent to b i (x) = b j (x). So, we have: Proposition 6.1 Any ordinal Nash outcome is an EMB outcome.
Of course, the converse will hold if the¯rst order condition is su±cient: Proposition 6.2 Suppose x is an EMB outcome. If all ® i
x and¯j x are quasi-concave then x is a Nash outcome.
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Thus, in the light of Proposition 5.1, we can conclude that if all ® i
x and¯j x are quasiconcave the concept of Nash outcome captures the logic behind the rotating o®ers game.
However, ® i
x and¯j x are not necessarily quasi-concave under our assumptions on preferences. Notice that, because of its additive structure,¯j x is concave (so quasi-concave) if
is convex in q and V i (1; x j ¡ s) is concave in s. In the multiplicatively separable case, these conditions follow if u j is concave and g j is convex, so that for the RDEU case quasi-concavity of¯j x follows from aversion to mean preserving spreads. Even in this case, however, ® i x can fail to be quasi-concave and the Nash outcome (which would be unique since aversion to mean preserving spreads is satis¯ed) might not exist. A family of two-person examples of this situation can be constructed as follows:
consider the bargaining problem where bargainer 1 has preferences over L e represented by V 1 (p; x) = g N (p) x and bargainer 2 is an expected value maximizer, i.e. we can choose
Clearly, for any bargaining problem within this family DUEL is satis¯ed, and since for both bargainers preferences are separable and V i xx = 0, CEC ¤ and IMCE hold as well.
Therefore for each N the bargaining problem has a unique EMB outcome,
where ¹ x is given by the equation 1= (g
. Routine calculations show that g 0 N (1) = 2 and g 00 N (1) = N + 2, This yields ¹ x = 1=3 independently of the value of N .
Intuitively, since each h N +1 is a convex transformation of h N , function g N gets increasingly \more convex" as N increases, and therefore the quasi-concavity of ® 1 x gets less unlikely to hold.
Since we are in a two-person 17 bargaining situation with a unique EMB outcome, for any given N the outcome ¹ x = (1=3; 2=3) is also the limit as ½ ! 1 of the (unique, by CEC ¤ ) SSPE proposals in the alternating o®ers game. In this situation, however, for su±ciently large values of N a Nash outcome does not exist, which we shall illustrate below. By Proposition 6.1, it su±ces to consider if ¹ x = (1=3; 2=3) can be successfully appealed. Since bargainer 2 is an expected value maximizer, bargainer 1 can appeal against ¹ x if there is a small concession s > 0 and probability 1 ¡ q with (i) (2=3) (1 ¡ q) = 2=3 ¡ s such that (ii)
1=3 < g N (1 ¡ q) (1=3 + s). In Figures 2(a) and 2(b) below we plot the line (i) and the upper contour set (ii), with p = 1 ¡ q and x = 1=3 + s for the cases N = 6 and N = 15, respectively.
It turns out, if N · 6 the upper contour set (ii) lies above (i) thus ¹ x is a Nash outcome.
If N > 6, however, there does exist a proposal which is preferred to receiving ¹ x = 1=3 for certain. 
Comparison with Safra and Zilcha's extensions
The Safra and Zilcha's functional Nash solution associates with a bargainer problem
the outcome in X that maximizes the product 
, and u i (1) = 1, and that we can choose g i (p) = p in the DL case. For the case in which the bargaining set X is the one-dimensional simplex, if preferences º i display risk aversion and D » i 0 then the functional generalization of Nash solution for both DL and RDEU preferences is characterized by the maximization program:
Comparing (9) with (4), we see that for the class of DL preferences this extension coincides with the EMB solution. However, for the class RDEU preferences, the EMB solution generally di®ers from the functional Nash solution.
A local utility approach also suggested in Safra and Zilcha's paper leads to a di®erent extension of the Nash solution to general (smooth) preferences: the sequential Nash solution. Since this extension coincides with the functional generalization for the case of RDEU preferences, it also di®ers from the EMB solution.
Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 3.3
We shall show that the determinant of (2) is positive. By relabeling row and column index k of (2) to I ¡ k + 1 , it su±ces to show the following (throughout, by convention, if i > n, index i indicates the i ¡ nth element).
Proof. The result holds by the following three lemmas.
Lemma B Let A = (a ij ) n i;j=1 be an n £ n matrix such that for all i, 1 = a ii¸ai+1i¸¢ ¢ ¢a i¡1i > 0 Then there exists a matrix B = (b ij ) n i;j=1 with the properties: (i) b ij = 1 or 0 for any i; j; (ii) 1 = b ii¸bi+1i¸¢ ¢ ¢¸b i¡1i ; (iii) det (A)¸det (B).
Proof of Lemma B. Denote by A ij the (i; j) cofactor of matrix A; that is, A ij is the determinant of the (n ¡ 1) £ (n ¡ 1) matrix which is obtained from A by eliminating i th row and j th column, multiplied by (¡1) i+j .
Consider the following procedure on matrix A: if there is a column such that 1 > a ij = a i+1j = ¢ ¢ ¢ = a kj > 0 for i < k, then if A ij +A i+1j + ¢ ¢ ¢ +A kj¸0 , then replace a ij ; a i+1j , ¢ ¢ ¢, a kj with a k+1;j (which is less than these elements by assumption), or else replace them with a i¡1;j . Observe that this procedure strictly increases the number of common elements in column j. Thus repeating this procedure¯nitely many times, every element of the matrix becomes either 1 or 0, and call it B. From the Laplace expansion, it readily follows that this procedure always decreases the determinant and it preserves the sign condition of the original matrix. Therefore B satis¯es the required properties. ¤ Lemma C If matrix B satis¯es (i) and (ii) in Lemma B, there exists a column k such that the sign of the determinant does not change if all the elements of column k are replaced with 1.
Proof of Lemma C.There is nothing to prove if there is a column where every element is 1. If not, choose a sequence of indices t k , k = 1; :::; n + 1, by the rule: t 1 = 1, t k is the¯rst t k > t k¡1 with b t k t k¡1 = 0. Since t k 2 f1; :::; ng, there are k and k 0 ; k 6 = k 0 , with t k = t k 0 and t k ; :::; t k 0 ¡1 are distinct. Denote by b (j) the j th column vector of B. We claim that Proof of Lemma D. We prove this by induction. It holds for n = 1. Suppose it is true for n ¡ 1, n > 1. By Lemma C, we can set one of the columns, say b (l), equal to e. If there is another column that is equal to e, det (B) = 0, and we are done. If not, pick t k , k = 1; :::; n + 1, as in the previous proof, starting with some t 1 6 = l. If ft k g constitutes a loop before t k = l occurs, the same argument shows that we can replace a column other than l th with e without changing the sign of the determinant, and so we are done. Otherwise, let k be the¯rst time t k = l. Then in the expression b (t 1 ) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + b (t k¡1 ), one appears exactly the same times (say ® times) in every row, except it appears one less in the l th row. Now multiply columns t 2 ; :::; t k¡1 by (1=®) and subtract them from to column b (l). This operation does not change the determinant, and the resulting column vector is zero for the o® diagonal elements, and the diagonal element is 1 ¡ ®¡1 ® > 0. By the Laplace expansion with respect to column l and the induction hypothesis, the determinant of the resulting matrix is non-negative. Thus det (B)¸0 holds for n. for all ig and consider a correspondence ¥ k from X k to itself given by
That is, ¥ k (x) assigns the worst available outcome if bargainer is not bold enough. Since
¹ b i (x) = 1, ¥ k is non-empty valued, and it is readily veri¯ed that it is convex valued with closed graph. So by Kakutani's¯xed point theorem, there is a¯xed point ¹ x k 2 X k , i.e., ¹ x k 2 ¥ k (¹ x k ), for each k. Abusing notation, we write f¹ x k : k = 1; :::g for a convergent subsequence, and let ¹ x 2 X be its limit point.
If ¹ x i = 0 for some i, then Non-existence of Ordinal Nash outcome if we allow for simultaneous concessions when I > 2
We will show that no outcome is robust against bargainers seeking concessions simultaneously from at least two of the other bargainers. If such a robust outcome existed, it must be an EMB outcome, so let x 2 4 be an EMB outcome. We shall show that x is not robust against bargainer 1 demanding an extra share. By the Implicit Function Theorem, for each j, I¸j¸2, there is a C 1 function s j (q) de¯ned for small q¸0 : Observe that since b j (x) = b 1 (x) for all j, then this expression is strictly positive, unless I = 2. This implies that bargainer 1 can successfully o®er s j (q) to each j simultaneously, for small enough probability of breakdown q, if I > 2.
